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ESSAY
THE  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  OF
ICONIC EXECUTIVES
Tom C.W. Lin*
This Essay explores the special corporate governance challenges posed by
iconic executives.  Iconic executives are complex, bittersweet figures in corpo-
rate governance narratives.  They are alluring, larger-than-life corporate
figures who often govern freely.  Iconic executives frequently rule like
monarchs over their firms, offering lofty promises to shareholders, directors,
and managers under their reign.  But like many stories of powerful and
influential figures, the narratives of iconic executives also contain adversity
and danger.  Part of the acquiescence and enchantment with such figures is
rooted in the virtuous promises embodied by their presence, promises of unity,
accountability, and effectiveness in corporate governance.  Unfortunately, for
many shareholders, these promises turn out to be illusory, empty, and full of
peril.  The threatening hollowness of such promises exists because the virtues
of unity, accountability, and effectiveness pledged by iconic executives also
contain the vices of excessive deference, overconfidence, and licentiousness.
Given such dangerous duplicity, this Essay calls for greater governance of
iconic executives.
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INTRODUCTION
The modern corporation is one of the greatest fictions and inven-
tions of humankind.1  It has made unparalleled wealth, unmatched
progress, and unimaginable innovations a reality through the ingenu-
ity and hard work of enterprising individuals.  Nonetheless, the mod-
ern corporation is not without its flaws and challenges, imperfections
and difficulties coded in its essential form.  The modern corporation
is owned by its shareholders, but governed by its directors and
officers.2  This inherent dissonance between ownership and manage-
ment creates many advantages,3 but also presents many corporate gov-
ernance challenges.4  Such challenges are exponentially magnified
and further complicated when the manager of a corporation is of ele-
vated stature and prominence, when the corporate manager is an
1 See 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 43 (1917) (“[T]he limited liability corporation is the greatest
single discovery of modern times.” (quoting Nicholas Murray Butler, President,
Colum. Univ., Address at the 143rd Annual Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce of
the State of New York (Nov. 16, 1911))); JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE,
THE COMPANY, at xv (2003) (“[The corporation is] the basis of the prosperity of the
West and the best hope for the future of the rest of the world.”).
2 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 6–7 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932).
3 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J.L. & ECON. 301, 301-02 (1983) (articulating the benefits of the corporate structure
derived from specialization, monitoring, and ratification by different stakeholders);
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the
Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1698–1700 (2001) (espousing the
virtues of centralized corporate management).
4 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 2, at 1164 (“The concentration of economic power
separate from ownership has, in fact, created economic empires, and has delivered
these empires into the hands of a new form of absolutism, relegating ‘owners’ to the
position of those who supply the means whereby the new princes may exercise their
power.”); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288, 288–91 (1980) (highlighting agency costs created by the organization of the cor-
porate firm).
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“iconic executive.”5  This special set of challenges resides in corporate
governance territory partially distinct from plots claimed by director-
ism,6 managerialism,7 and shareholderism.8  The aim of this Essay is to
venture into this distinct territory and explore this special set of cor-
porate governance issues: the corporate governance challenges posed
by powerful and influential iconic executives.
This Essay does not intend to serve as a normative, wholesale
indictment of the corporate governance of iconic executives, nor does
it intend to serve as a descriptive, resigned apology of the status quo.
Instead, this Essay inquires into the unique considerations presented
by the corporate governance of iconic executives and cautions against
blind assent to their governance.
This Essay proceeds with this inquiry in three parts.  Part I begins
with a character sketch of iconic executives.9  It describes their distinct
attributes and functions in the modern corporation, and proffers an
explanation for their seductive allure.  Part II then explores the prom-
ise of iconic executives.  Borrowing from constitutional law’s discourse
on the unitary presidency,10 it illuminates the interrelated virtues of
unity, accountability, and effectiveness in having a strong corporate
unitary executive.  Pivoting into the shadows, Part III examines the
vices of such imperial governance and warns of the perils of iconic
executives.  Utilizing an instructive, albeit inelegant, penumbra cast by
political despots, dictators, and strongmen, it warns against excessive
deference, overconfidence, and licentiousness in boardrooms and
executive suites.  Finally, this Essay concludes with a cautionary coda
on the bittersweet duplicity of iconic executives.
5 For a character sketch of an “iconic executive” for the purpose of this Essay,
see infra Part I.A.
6 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Cor-
porate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (outlining the director-centric model
of corporate governance).
7 See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977) (describing the manager-dominant model
of corporate governance).
8 See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corpo-
rate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440–41 (2001) (articulating the shareholder-based model
of corporate governance).
9 Iconic executives exist at both privately-held and publicly-traded business enti-
ties, but this Essay will focus primarily on those at large publicly-traded corporate
firms because of their select prominence and influence.
10 See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 3–10
(2008) (providing an overview of the debate on the unitary presidency theory).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-1\NDL107.txt unknown Seq: 4  9-JAN-12 9:50
354 notre dame law review [vol. 87:1
I. ICONIC EXECUTIVES
Iconic executives are precious and rare creatures in the corporate
ecosystem.  The contemporary iconic executive is an epiphenomenon
of modern media and modern business, often appearing as an allur-
ing chimera of businessman, statesman, and celebrity.11  Iconic execu-
tives frequently serve as the chairman and chief executive of
prominent publicly-traded corporations.12  Many perceived the mod-
ern iconic executive as both a personification and a reincarnation of
the mythical captain of industry from the Industrial Age, as described
by Thorstein Veblen:
In the typical case he was business manager of the venture as well as
foreman of the works, and not infrequently he was the designer and
master-builder of the equipment of which he was the responsible
owner . . . . [A] man of workmanlike force and creative insight into
the community’s needs, who stood out on a footing of self-help,
took large chances for large ideals, and came in for his gains as due
reward for work well done in the service of the common good, in
designing and working out more effective organization and indus-
trial forces and in creating and testing out new and better processes
of production.13
The iconic executive is distinct from his or her ordinary boar-
droom brethren.  Whereas ordinary executives are seen as mere tem-
porary stewards of their firms, iconic executives are viewed as oracles,
visionaries, and gurus.14  Whereas ordinary executives are perceived as
important to the success of their firms, iconic executives are viewed as
indispensable to the success of their firms.  Whereas ordinary execu-
tives are considered as one of many factors for investors, iconic execu-
11 See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material Matters of
Public Company Executives, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 383, 389–92 (2009) (discussing the
impact of modern media and investor diversification in elevating corporate execu-
tives); Patricia Sanchez Abril, The Evolution of Business Celebrity in American Law and
Society, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 178 (2011) (“Over the past half-century, digital communi-
cations, globalization, mass-market media and advertising, and a heightened public
interest in business matters have conspired to shine a brighter spotlight on business
leaders as stars.”).
12 See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 62 (2008) (noting that in the
United States “board chairmen of 70 percent of public companies serve concurrently
as CEO of the company”).
13 THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT
TIMES 103–04 (Augustus M. Kelley 1964) (1923).
14 See Mathew L.A. Hayward et al., Believing One’s Own Press: The Causes and Conse-
quences of CEO Celebrity, 25 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 637, 638–43 (2004) (discussing popular
creation myths and perceptions of celebrity CEOs).
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tives are considered the determinative factor for investors.15  Whereas
ordinary executives are seen as faceless managers of their corpora-
tions, iconic executives are seen as doppelgangers of their firms.
Throughout her exceptional history, America has been fortunate
to have had more than its fair share of iconic executives in the past
and in the present.16  Iconic executives of time past like Andrew Car-
negie, Henry Ford, John Pierpont Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, Cor-
nelius Vanderbilt, and Sam Walton helped a nation rebuild after the
Civil War, rise out of the Great Depression, and move towards the
Great Society.  Present day, iconic executives like Warren Buffett, Bill
Gates, Steve Jobs, Jeff Bezos, Jamie Dimon, Sergey Brin, and Larry
Page are helping to create wealth and economic progress to safeguard
the present and shape the future.17  For many investors and individu-
als, these iconic executives become mythical figures with seductive
allure.
Part of the profound enchantment with iconic executives can be
explained by the immeasurable, amorphous, and complex nature of
leadership and power.  Effective leadership can manifest itself in a
wide range of personalities from all backgrounds.18  More than one
type of person can make for an effective executive.  Often, an execu-
tive is effective because of soft values and soft skills that are difficult to
measure and replicate.19  Thus, individuals, like iconic executives,
15 See, e.g., GIDEON HAIGH, FAT CATS: THE STRANGE CULT OF THE CEO 98 (2005)
(“A survey found that 95 percent of respondents were influenced in stock selection by
the CEO’s profile and reputation.”).
16 American executives arguably are more powerful and influential than many of
their international counterparts given the importance of American corporations rela-
tive to those based in other countries. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increas-
ing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 848 (2005) (highlighting American
corporate law’s historic preference of managerial power over shareholder power);
Jens Dammann, How Embattled are U.S. CEOs?, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 201, 210
(2010), http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/seealso/vol88/pdf/88TexasL
RevSeeAlso201.pdf (“Moreover, it is well worth remembering that, decline or not,
U.S. CEOs remain very powerful by international standards.”).
17 It is important to note that iconic executives need not be corporate successes
and saints.  In fact, iconic executives can turn out to be corporate scoundrels and
failures that lead their firms to spectacular demises.
18 See Peter F. Drucker, What Makes an Effective Executive, HARV. BUS. REV., June
2004, at 63 (“Effective executives differ widely in their personalities, strengths, weak-
nesses, values, and beliefs.  All they have in common is that they get the right things
done.”).
19 See Daniel Goleman, What Makes a Leader?, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2004, at 82
(discussing the soft qualities of “emotional intelligence” inherent in successful leader-
ship).  In addition to soft, immeasurable qualities, chance and luck can play a critical
role in the effectiveness and success of a leader. See, e.g., LEONARD MLODINOW, THE
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who appear to possess such illusive traits and produce sustainable, suc-
cessful results are exalted, and given great liberties to manage their
firms.
Functionally, because of the exalted stature of iconic executives,
they exert a great deal of influence internally within their organiza-
tions and externally with the wider public.20  Internally, iconic execu-
tives often unilaterally set forth the strategic visions of their firms, and
carefully manage the execution of those visions.21  Iconic executives
do this more so than ordinary executives.  Iconic executives often
have an overwhelming influence in the composition of the firm’s
board of directors, the selection of high-level operational managers,
and the operation of the corporation’s key departments.22
Externally, business peers, policymakers, regulators, journalists,
and the public view iconic executives as social celebrities, thought
leaders, economic mavens, and business gurus.23  Among their busi-
ness brethren, iconic executives, their behaviors, and their policies are
often viewed as models and templates to adopt, mimic, and replicate.
Therefore, the practices of iconic executives—good and bad—can sig-
nificantly influence trends and norms in the business world.  Outside
of the business realm, iconic executives serve as counselors to presi-
DRUNKARD’S WALK 13, 205 (2009) (opining on the random, but important, role of
luck on the perceived success and failure of a business executive); Marianne Bertrand
& Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck?  The Ones Without Principals Are,
116 Q.J. ECON. 901, 901–93 (2001) (testing the role of good fortune in an executive’s
performance-tied compensation).
20 Some commentators and scholars have suggested that there has been a shift
towards reining in the imperial governance of corporate executives at the beginning
of the twenty-first century. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88
TEX. L. REV. 987, 989 (2010) (“The CEOs of publicly held corporations in the United
States are losing power.”); David Leonhardt & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Reining in the
Imperial C.E.O.: Handshakes Are Becoming a Bit Less Golden, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, at
BU1.  While that observation may have some merit, corporate executives still, none-
theless, wield a great deal of power, and this is especially the case with iconic execu-
tives. See Bebchuk, supra note 16, at 913–14 (stating that management often
dominates the governance of corporations to the firm’s detriment); Dammann, supra
note 16, at 201 (“U.S. managers are in fact quite powerful, especially by international
standards.”).
21 See RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR 179–85 (2002) (dis-
cussing superior bargaining leverage of CEO candidates and reliance on their corpo-
rate visions); MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS 78–85 (1971) (excerpting interviews with
senior executives who attest to the supreme power of some CEOs within
corporations).
22 See infra Part III.A.
23 See Lin, supra note 11, at 383–95 (discussing the rise in social prominence of
corporate executives).  See generally KHURANA, supra note 21 (discussing various attrib-
utes of charismatic and celebrity CEOs).
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dents, legislators, and ministers—foreign and domestic—on a whole
host of matters.24  In short, they populate a superclass of merchant
statesmen that influence policies and decisions beyond those of their
own firms, industries, and nation-states.25
Ultimately, because of their select prominence, influence, and
power, iconic executives offer special promises and pose distinct dan-
gers for their firms, their shareholders, and the larger public.
II. THE PROMISE OF UNITARY CORPORATE EXECUTIVES
Iconic executive power holds special promises for the modern
corporation.  Executive power in the governance structure of our fed-
eral body politic offers an instructive lens for examining the promises
of executive power in the governance structure of our corporations.
The President of the United States has frequently been compared to
the chief executive of a large, complex corporation.26  As President
Calvin Coolidge famously observed, “The business of America is
business.”27
Fundamental governance principles, in the political and corpo-
rate realms, often find bases in the allocation of power among sepa-
rate groups of stakeholders.28  The governance powers of the
American federal government are divided among three co-equal
branches—the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the judi-
cial branch.29  This division in political power is in large part a reac-
tion to the unchecked rule of the British crown over the colonies
24 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Anahad O’Connor, Obama Alters Panel of Advisors,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, at B7 (reporting on the formation of a panel of business
executives and other stakeholders to advise President Obama on jobs and economic
competitiveness).
25 See C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 3–7 (2000) (discussing the role of cor-
porate leaders in the elite circle of national power); DAVID ROTHKOPF, SUPERCLASS
33–37 (2009) (reporting on how some corporate executives populate a premium
place in the global power structure).
26 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power in Political and Corporate Contexts, 12
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 277, 282–83 (2010) (comparing executive power in the political
and corporate contexts).
27 JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA 247 (2002).
28 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 20, at 992–95 (grounding discussions of corpo-
rate executive power in political and social theory on the topic). See generally ROBERT
A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (2d ed. 2005) (examining corporate political governance
principles through the prism of New Haven politics); STEVEN LUKES, POWER (2d ed.
2005) (examining sociological aspects of power and influence); MILLS, supra note 25,
at 3–7 (discussing the nature of great individuals and their influence over others).
29 For a historical perspective, see THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 48 (James Madison)
(professing the need for separate branches of government).
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prior to American independence.30  Similarly, the governance power
of the modern corporation is also divided among three groups—the
directors, the managers, and the shareholders.31
Justifications to aggrandize federal political power in the execu-
tive branch, known as the unitary executive theory,32 often find root
in the interrelated promises of unity, accountability, and effective-
ness.33  Analogously, the promises of iconic executives find persuasive
rationales in the same three interconnected promises.
A. Unity
A chief promise of iconic executives is that they offer a unity of
vision, purpose, and power to the governance of a corporation.  Such
unity serves as a bulwark against different stakeholders with disparate,
competing, and perhaps conflicting interests, much in the same fash-
ion that a strong presidency guards against state and local pressures of
contrasting constituencies in favor of national interests.34
The iconic executive is a personification of the promise of unity:
the unity of corporate personality and corporate purpose.  Iconic
executives often serve concurrently as the chairman and chief execu-
tive officer of a corporation.35  They also are often the founders and
chief architects of large publicly-traded corporations and, therefore,
are presumed to be especially protective of their corporations’ image,
interests, and culture since the firm is often the by-product of their
lives’ most important work.  For many iconic executives, their
30 See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and
Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 225–28 (1989).
31 See John Pound, The Promise of the Governed Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar.–Apr. 1995, at 94 (stating that directors, managers, and shareholders are the key
constituencies in corporate governance).
32 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 10, at 2–9 (providing an overview of the uni-
tary executive theory in constitutional law discourse).
33 See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48
ARK. L. REV. 23, 36 (1995) (“The essential ingredient to combating the congressional
collective action problem is the President’s national voice, because he, and he alone,
speaks for the entire American people.”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2332–39 (2001) (extolling the virtues of decisive executive
action).
34 See Calabresi, supra note 33, at 42 (“Any deviation from the principle of unitari-
ness in the executive structure immediately opens up a crack into which the state and
local pressures described above will tend to insinuate themselves.” (emphasis
omitted)).
35 See MACEY, supra note 12, at 98 (“[I]f the board is supposed to play a manage-
rial role and provide strategic support for the company, as maintained by the manage-
rial model of boards, then combining the CEO function and the function of board
chair makes perfect sense.”).
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blueprints for their firms are so viscerally a part of their corporations’
genetic fabric that investors often view them synonymously with their
firms.  Warren Buffett is Berkshire Hathaway.  Martha Stewart is
Martha Stewart Omnimedia.  Steve Jobs is Apple.  Bill Gates is
Microsoft.  Sam Walton is Wal-Mart.  Therefore, the interests of iconic
executives presumably are perfectly aligned and attached with their
shareholders’ interests36—to maximize shareholder wealth.37
As a matter of governance, the iconic executive in theory person-
ally manifests and efficiently executes a singular, purposeful vision of
the corporation without dilutions from other parties.38  The iconic
executive designs the firm’s strategic blueprint, hires its executors,
manages its construction, and markets its final outputs.  Some per-
ceive this unitary paradigm of governance as superior to models that
are based on divided power among many stakeholders because it
enhances strategic cohesiveness and reduces agency costs.39  Steve
Jobs, the former CEO and co-founder of Apple, reportedly
micromanaged almost all aspects of Apple, from product design to
manufacturing to marketing to store construction to corporate strat-
egy.40  Mr. Jobs’s prolific micromanagement is partially reflected in
the fact that he is named as the inventor or co-inventor of 313 Apple
patents relating to inventions ranging from the glass staircases in its
stores to the power adapters on its computers.41  Many investors and
analysts attribute Apple’s incredible success in the first decade of the
twenty-first century to Mr. Jobs’s monolithic embodiment and detailed
control of the firm.42
36 See Renee Adams et al., Understanding the Relationship between Founder-CEOs and
Firm Performance, 16 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 136, 136–51 (2009) (showing a strong, positive
correlation between higher valuations of firms with founder-CEOs relative to firms
without founder-CEOs).
37 See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 552 (stating that shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion is the guiding impetus of corporations).
38 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 20, at 993 (assessing the wide scope of a corpo-
rate executive’s power over multiple facets of a corporation).
39 For a definitive overview of agency cost in the corporate form, see generally
Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980);
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
40 See Alan Deutschman, Exit the King, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 5, 2011 at 30 (“[Steve
Jobs] proved himself the ultimate willful leader, forging his singular vision through a
combination of inspiration, unilateralism, and gut instinct.”); Adam Lashinsky, The
Decade of Steve, FORTUNE MAG., Nov. 23, 2009, at 89–96.
41 See Miguel Helft, Attention to Detail, Noted in 313 Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25,
2011 at B6.
42 See id.
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B. Accountability
A second promise of iconic executives, related to the pledge of
unity, is the promise of enhanced accountability.  Like the unitary
president of constitutional legal theory, because vision, strategy, and
execution all reside primarily within one corporate actor, it is dis-
tinctly and theoretically easier to hold that one actor accountable for
the successes and failures of the corporation.43  In corporations where
power and influence are diffused among a plurality of managers,
responsibility and accountability likewise are diffused.  Such diffusion
sometimes renders it more difficult for shareholders and other stake-
holders to accurately cast blame or give credit to the responsible
parties.
The corporation of the iconic executive does not suffer from
such a problem of dispersed accountability.  Just as the presidency’s
unitary structure and singular personhood renders it easier—rightly
or wrongly—for the electorate to hold him accountable every four
years,44 the iconic executive’s concentrated and all-encompassing
influence on his corporation theoretically makes it easier for share-
holders to hold him or her responsible (perhaps too much so) for
triumphs and failures.  When Berkshire Hathaway fails or succeeds,
blame or credit is attributed to Warren Buffett.  When Amazon fails or
succeeds, criticism or praise is given to Jeff Bezos.  While individual
shareholders may lack the will and resources to hold an executive
accountable, the rise of institutional shareholders like hedge funds,
private equity groups, pension funds, and mutual funds have ample
will and resources, in theory, to hold an underperforming executive
accountable.45
C. Effectiveness
A third promise of iconic executives is that of increased effective-
ness in corporate governance.  Because of the unitary nature of iconic
executives, they are not beset with the indecisions and inefficiencies
that often plague and characterize the actions of a plurality of actors.
43 See Calabresi, supra note 33, at 65 (“[T]he President is unique in our constitu-
tional system as being the only official who is accountable to a national voting electo-
rate and no one else.”).
44 See Kagan, supra note 33, at 2332 (“The Presidency’s unitary power structure,
its visibility, and its ‘personality’ all render the office peculiarly apt to exercise power
in ways that the public can identify and evaluate.”).
45 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 20, at 995–1000 (discussing the rise and activism
of institutional shareholders).  For a more skeptical alternative view of institutional
shareholder activism, see infra Part III.A.1.
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Similar logic has been used to justify a stronger executive branch in
the political context.46  Because vision, power, and execution are cen-
tralized in one actor, the iconic executive, theoretically, can act in a
more expedient and effective manner than executives that do not
wield similar managerial power and influence over their firms.47
The promise of effectiveness is particularly seductive in modern
times because a frequently cited ingredient of a successful modern
business is swift decisions in the face of accelerated, shifting market
trends.48  Kenneth Arrow, in his seminal organizational theory tome,
The Limits of Organization, espoused this sentiment: “Under conditions
of widely dispersed information and the need for speed in decisions,
authoritative control at the tactical level is essential for success.”49
This is especially true of a large modern corporation in the age of
globalization.  A large modern corporation can consist of a myriad of
divisions and departments that span industries, time zones, and
nation-states.  For example, the General Electric Company (GE) has
as of 2011, in more than 100 countries, about 300,000 employees
working in industries ranging from “aircraft engines and power gener-
ation to financial services, medical imaging, and television
programming.”50
Organizations governed by a plurality of actors often suffer from
collective action constraints and information asymmetries that lead to
indecisiveness, infighting, and inefficiency.51  Politically, legislative
action through Congress generally requires more time than executive
action from the President.52  The same holds true for analogous cor-
porate decisions decided by committees, cooperatives, or multiple
managers.  The iconic executive can sidestep the problems of collec-
tive action that dispersed stakeholders and managers share and act in
46 See Kagan, supra note 33, at 2339 (“Because he is a unitary actor, he can act
without the indecision and inefficiency that so often characterize the behavior of col-
lective entities.”).
47 See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68–70 (1974).
48 See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & MICHAEL E. RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLU-
TION 35–38 (2003) (studying the need for innovation and swift corporate action in
the face of increasing competitive pressures).
49 ARROW, supra note 47, at 69.
50 See Fact Sheet, GEN. ELECTRIC CO., http://www.ge.com/company/factsheets/
corporate.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2011).
51 See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 555–56 (“Fiat can also lower costs associated
with uncertainty, opportunism, and complexity.”); Kagan, supra note 33, at 2339 (dis-
cussing the benefits of a singular actor governance paradigm relative to a governance
paradigm based on a plurality of actors).
52 See ARTHUR CHESTER MILLSPAUGH, DEMOCRACY, EFFICIENCY, AND STABILITY 278
(1942) (criticizing the slowness and fitfulness of congressional lawmaking).
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a prudent, expeditious manner as required by the demands of fast-
moving modern markets.53  Just as proponents of unitary presidencies
argue that modern circumstances demand a stronger executive
branch in the political sphere,54 the iconic executive promises to ful-
fill such demands of modernity in the corporate sphere.
III. THE PERILS OF IMPERIAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Iconic executives can govern firms like corporate emperors and
empresses, holding primacy over shareholders, directors, and manag-
ers during their reign.55  This imperial model of corporate govern-
ance offers great promises to the governed, but those promises can be
illusory, empty, and full of peril.56  The linked virtues of unity,
accountability, and effectiveness that iconic executives promise also
contain the intertwined vices of excessive deference, overconfidence,
and licentiousness.57  These vices afflict executive scoundrels and
saints, the well-intentioned as well as the ill-willed.  Because of these
vices, corporate boardrooms can become populated with naked iconic
executives who are not exposed “until the tide goes out,”58 and when
that proverbial tide goes out, it often can be too late for shareholders
and investors.
53 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 331 (2004) (suggesting that managerial power
increases with dispersed ownership among shareholders).
54 See Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Informa-
tion Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 374 (2010) (stating
that “modern life [makes] unitary executive theory so deeply appealing” despite its
unfilled promises); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Adminis-
tration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 91–92 (1994) (suggesting that modern circumstances
may make the unitary executive model more attractive relative to models with greater
plurality).
55 See A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365, 1366 (1932) (opining that corporate managers generally operate like
“princes and ministers”).
56 See Leonhardt & Sorkin, supra note 20 (reporting on how imperial corporate
governance led to superior compensation for executives and subpar returns for share-
holders at some firms).
57 See infra Part III.A–C.
58 RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM 221 (2009) (quoting Warren
Buffett).
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A. Excessive Deference
1. Organizational Deference
Deference to directors and officers is inherent in the corporate
form.  Shareholders own the corporation, but directors and officers
manage it.59  Accordingly, shareholders lack meaningful supervisory
powers over their firms and its managers, which can lead to steep
agency costs.60  As a matter of law and practice, the “original and
undelegated” governance powers of the corporation reside with direc-
tors and authorized officers on most issues.61  Due to a number of
factors, iconic executives exacerbate and capture much of this defer-
ence, given their exalted roles in their corporations.62
First, iconic executives, especially those who are concurrently
chief executive officers and chairmen of their corporations, often pos-
sess an incredible amount of influence over the selection and compo-
sition of their board of directors, senior managers, senior staff,
outside advisors, and gatekeepers.63  With regards to directors, execu-
tives often engage in “homosocial reproduction”64 and select like-
minded individuals to work with them and to execute their visions.65
Thus, it should not be surprising that many current and former corpo-
rate executive officers serve on corporate boards, even interlocking
firms in their service.66  Therefore, many technically independent67
59 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 2, at 6–8.
60 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1145, 1147 (1932) (stating that corporate managers are “free from any substan-
tial supervision by stockholders”).
61 See Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918); see also Bainbridge, supra
note 6, at 559 (“The statutory decisionmaking model thus is one in which the board
acts and the shareholders, at most, react.”).
62 See Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board—
The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 127–30 (1996) (“[T]he most
significant problem facing corporate America today is the management-dominated,
passive board of directors.”).
63 See James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power,
Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60, 61–65 (1995).
64 ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 48 (1977).
65 See Barry Baysinger & Robert E. Hoskisson, The Composition of Boards of Directors
and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 72, 72–73 (1990)
(“[M]anagers dominate their boards by using their de facto power to select and com-
pensate directors and by exploiting personal ties with them.”).
66 See Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, CEO Compensation and Turnover: The
Effects of Mutually Interlocked Boards, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 935, 947–51 (2003)
(“[T]he number of mutual director interlocks is found to be significant.”).
67 The New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ Stock Market requires the boards
of most of its listed companies to consist of a majority of independent directors. See
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and highly qualified boards are not objectively independent.68  For
instance, in 2011, News Corporation, the global media conglomerate
headed by its founder and chief executive Rupert Murdoch, had
legally independent directors that included a “godfather to one of Mr.
Murdoch’s children and another who ran one of Mr. Murdoch’s Aus-
tralian subsidiaries,” and other board members that “included many
people with deep and longstanding ties to Mr. Murdoch, his company,
and his family.”69
With regards to senior managers and staff, executives can, wit-
tingly or unwittingly, pack their lower-level personnel population with
yes-people who have sycophantic tendencies to blindly execute their
strategies without critique or concern.70  While having likeminded
individuals on a team can better facilitate a shared vision, this uni-
formity, in thought, can also lead to groupthink and extremism in the
pursuit of a flawed, improperly vetted vision.71
With regards to outside advisors and gatekeepers such as attor-
neys, accountants, and bankers, executives often hire firms and indi-
viduals who subscribe wholesale to their views as opposed to objective
parties who can check and refine their views.72  “For the outside
observer, substitute judge, juror, or regulator, the importance of the
gatekeeper’s cognitive role is clear: The gatekeeper’s task is to bring
the outsider perspective to work ex ante, as a risk management
device.”73  As a result of the biased hiring practices of executives and
the biased behavioral tendencies of gatekeepers, shareholders are
NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, NASDAQ INC., http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 22, 2011) (listing Rule 5605(b)(1)); Listed Company Manual, NYSE, INC.
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2011) (listing
§ 303A.01–.02).
68 See MACEY, supra note 12, at 84 (“The board of directors of Enron provides a
vivid example of the following point: even boards that appear from the outside to be
independent, professional, and highly qualified are susceptible to board capture.”).
69 Jeremy W. Peters, For Murdoch, a Board Meeting with Friendly Faces, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2011, at BU1.
70 See Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853,
873–74 (1995); Canice Prendergast, A Theory of “Yes Men”, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 757, 769
(1993).
71 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, GOING TO EXTREMES 85–93 (2009) (discussing how inter-
actions among like-minded individuals can lead to extremism and group
polarization).
72 See Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1597–99 (2010)
(explaining the importance of various, interdependent corporate gatekeepers).
73 Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street:  A Gatekeeper’s
Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
1209, 1214 (2011).
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deprived of meaningful gatekeepers.74  Enron failed, in part, because
its outside law firm, Vinson & Elkins, and its independent auditor,
Arthur Andersen—two of the most important gatekeepers for Enron
shareholders—did not properly caution against the excesses and
aggressiveness of the firm’s imperial executives.75  The same can be
said of many gatekeepers at a number of large financial institutions in
the years prior to the recent financial crisis.76
In sum, while personnel and gatekeeper selection of similar-
minded individuals and institutions can enhance corporate cohesion,
such self-selection, incest, and insularity can also breed excessive def-
erence to iconic executives and unduly damage the stability and long-
term success of firms when such individuals and institutions subscribe
blindly to an executive’s will.77
Second, iconic executives often can form and execute the funda-
mental strategies of their corporations with little or no organizational
dissent, internally and externally.  Internally, the self-selected boards
and managers of many iconic executives likely will be reluctant to
question or second-guess the decisions of their revered chief executive
officer and chairman.78  “[I]n the United States, where the board
chairmen of 70 percent of public companies serve concurrently as
CEO of the company, challenging senior management may be viewed
74 See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM
406–08 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stu-
pid”, 57 BUS. L. 1403, 1403–07 (2002) (discussing how deficient gatekeeping led to
the demise of Enron).
75 See Coffee, supra note 74, at 1403–07; Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and
The Perfect Storm, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1373, 1385–91 (2003).
76 See Langevoort, supra note 73, at 1212 (“By most accounts, the gatekeepers at
many financial firms did a poor job in the events leading up to the crisis.”).
77 See David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value,
38 FIN. REV. 33, 51 (2003) (suggesting that board diversity leads to better corporate
results); M. Andrew Fields & Phyllis Y. Keys, The Emergence of Corporate Governance from
Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Manage-
rial Incentives to Bear Risk, 38 FIN. REV. 1, 12–13 (2003) (espousing the view that board
diversity is strongly correlated with superior financial performance); Anil Shivdasani
& David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical
Analysis, 54 J. FINANCE 1829, 1852 (1999) (suggesting higher market capitalization for
firms that select directors without CEO input).
78 See Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regula-
tory Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 332 (2007) (“CEOs of public
companies have the unique privilege of picking their own nominal supervisors—the
board of directors.”).  As an example of a board reluctant to disagree and debate with
its powerful CEO and chairman, see JAMES B. STEWART, DISNEYWAR 531 (2005) (dis-
cussing how Disney’s CEO, Michael Eisner, manipulated his passive board members
to serve his ends).
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as insubordinate.”79  Externally, few outside parties are capable of
meaningfully critiquing and checking executive decisions, given the
economic and organizational advantages of corporate officers.80  Only
incumbent executives, for instance, are permitted to use corporate
funds to solicit proxy votes, which can be a very expensive and labor-
intensive process.81  Additionally, “[t]he political system is custom-
made for those with great stakes in corporate governance—the CEOs
of America’s public corporations—to dominate the content of corpo-
rate governance.”82  Iconic executives can use their personal stature
and corporate funds to lobby and influence legislative efforts that
attempt to curtail their expansive powers and interests.83  In the lead
up to the passage of the landmark Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act in 2010,84 many financial institutions
and their executives expended great efforts and huge sums of corpo-
rate funds to lobby against the legislation.85
Third, in addition to structural limitations, information asymme-
try and investor apathy weaken shareholder activism as a possible insti-
tutional check on iconic executives.  While public corporations make
periodic material disclosures to the public through securities filings to
inform investors and regulators, such disclosures may be incompre-
hensible, incomplete, or nonexistent.86  For instance, when Apple’s
former iconic CEO, Steve Jobs, took medical leaves in 2009,87 and
again in early 2011, under mysterious circumstances on both occa-
sions,88 the company made no meaningful disclosures about Mr.
79 MACEY, supra note 12, at 62.
80 See Ramirez, supra note 78, at 349 (“CEOs are simply better organized and
have superior economic and political resources than the investing public.”).
81 See C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Expenses Incurred by Competing Factions Within Corpo-
ration in Soliciting Proxies as Charge Against Corporations, 51 A.L.R. FED. 873 (1957).
82 Ramirez, supra note 78, at 355.
83 See Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New
Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1233 (2006) (discussing the pervasive
influence of corporations on the political process).
84 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
85 See Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Contentious Overhaul of the Financial System, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2010, at B3 (reporting on the well-funded and well-organized corpo-
rate lobbying efforts against the legislation).
86 See Tom C.W. Lin, A Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk, 34 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 325, 349–56 (2011) (critiquing various shortcomings of the securities disclosure
system).
87 See Yukari Iwatani Kane, Apple’s Jobs Takes Medical Leave, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15,
2009, at A1.
88 See Miguel Helft, Jobs Takes Leave at Apple Again; Stirs Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2011, at A1.
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Jobs’s condition, despite his incomparable importance to his firm.
Apple shares gyrated in the absence of solid information and the pres-
ence of persistent false rumors, ranging from Mr. Jobs’s suffering a
heart attack89 to Mr. Jobs’s death.90  When Mr. Jobs ultimately
resigned as chief executive of Apple in late August 2011 with the
release of a brief letter short on details,91 the stock dropped by 5 per-
cent in after-hours trading following the announcement.92  Mr. Jobs
would pass away several weeks later in early October 2011, at the age
of 56.93
Furthermore, the economic incentives do not properly
encourage most individual investors to educate themselves by reading
securities disclosures.  “Given the length and complexity of corporate
disclosure documents, the opportunity cost entailed in making
informed decisions is both high and apparent.  In contrast, the
expected benefits of becoming informed are quite low . . . .”94  And
even when shareholders are properly informed, attempts at activism,
such as through corporate elections, “are plagued by a variety of col-
lective action and signaling” problems.95  Similarly, many institutional
shareholders lack proper economic incentives and organizing mecha-
nisms to meaningfully engage in shareholder activism.96  Many institu-
tional investors, for instance, are transient investors focused on
quarterly or annual returns for their portfolio of numerous invest-
ments.  Therefore it makes little sense for them to engage in pro-
longed shareholder activism and monitoring, where they bear much
89 See Seth Liss, Social Media Allows Public to Shape the News, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lau-
derdale), Aug. 16, 2009, at 1F (noting that Apple’s stock price dropped upon false
rumors that Steve Jobs had suffered a heart attack).
90 See Matthew Moore, Steve Jobs’s Obituary Published by Bloomberg, TELEGRAPH
(London), Aug. 28, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howabout
that/2638481/Steve-Jobs-obituary-published-by-Bloomberg.html.
91 David Streitfeld, Jobs Steps Down at Apple, Saying He Cannot Meet Duties, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2011, at A1.
92 Id.  It should be noted that the stock stabilized during the next trading day.
See Matt Krantz, Day after Jobs Resigns, Apple Stock Losses Minor, USA TODAY, Aug. 26,
2011, at 1B.
93 See John Markoff, Apple’s Visionary Redefined Digital Age, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2011,
at A1 (reporting on the death and life of Steve Jobs).
94 Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 558.
95 MACEY, supra note 12, at 211.
96 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751–54 (2006) (describing the lack of incentives for financial
firms to engage in shareholder activism); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain)
Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 446, 473–74 (1991)
(articulating economic disincentives for fund managers to engage in shareholder
activism).
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of the costs of the fight, and their competitors can free-ride the bene-
fits of their efforts.
In sum, the economic factors simply do not incentivize many indi-
vidual shareholders to try to actively engage in corporate govern-
ance.97  Moreover, limited resources and other issues constrain many
institutional shareholders from engaging in consistent, meaningful
shareholder activism and monitoring.98
The net result, from an organizational perspective, is an almost
wholesale deference to the iconic executive.  While such deference
can lead to swift and effective action to the benefit of a corporation, it
can also create opportunities for serious abuse.  While such deference
exists in many corporate boardrooms, and may be instinctual,99 iconic
executives present especially magnified iterations of these challenges
because of their exalted status, the degree of deference afforded to
them, and the lack of strong checks-and-balances against their power.
Famed investor, John Bogle, and others have suggested that excessive
deference can mutate “traditional owners’ capitalism to the new man-
agers’ capitalism,”100 kill any meaningful corporate governance, and
destroy shareholder wealth creation.101  For instance, iconic execu-
tives could use their outsized influence and power to enrich them-
selves at the expense of investors in the absence of any meaningful
organizational checks on their power.102  Empirical studies suggest
that CEO influence and power is closely and positively correlated with
97 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390–92 (1986) (discussing the
rational apathy of shareholders); see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Activism and
Corporate Governance in the United States, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECO-
NOMICS AND THE LAW 459, 460 (1998) (discussing the limited effects of shareholder
activism).
98 See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 571–72 (“Even the most active institutional
investors devote only limited resources to corporate governance . . . .”); Rock, supra
note 96, at 465–66 (describing the lack of rational incentives for some institutional
investors to actively participate in corporate governance). But see Bebchuk, supra note
16, at 888–92 (suggesting that sophisticated institutional investors would be more
inclined to engage in shareholder activism absent certain legal constraints).
99 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 73, at 1214 (arguing that corporate gatekeep-
ers are sometimes cognitively lulled to “relax their guard” in the presence of success-
ful and optimistic individuals).
100 JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 28 (2005).
101 See Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON.
107, 108–09 (2003) (hypothesizing that superior corporate governance can lead to
superior results).
102 See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives: It’s Not How Much You
Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1990, at 138; Leonhardt & Sorkin, supra
note 20.
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CEO compensation.103  The stock options backdating scandals that
unfolded in 2006 and 2007 involved many firms with very powerful
CEOs such as Apple, Barnes & Noble, Cablevision, and Research in
Motion, who unjustly and unscrupulously enriched themselves at the
shareholder’s expense with the blessing of their boards.104
2. Legal Deference
Courts historically have shown great procedural and substantive
deference to the decisions and judgments of corporate executives.105
Procedurally, many state corporate law statutes, especially Dela-
ware, make it very cumbersome for shareholders to bring derivative
suits on behalf of a corporation; and private federal securities actions
offer no easier path for shareholders.106  Preparing, submitting, and
litigating a derivative lawsuit requires resources that are prohibitively
high for most investors.  For example, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23.1, and similar state equivalents, a shareholder may
not bring a lawsuit unless they make a demand of the board or unless
such demand is excused.107  “At a minimum, a demand must identify
the alleged wrongdoers, describe the factual basis of the wrongful acts
and the harm caused to the corporation, and request remedial
relief.”108  Moreover, once a demand is submitted, a corporation can
terminate the action at its reasonable discretion, even if the allega-
tions in the demand have merit, so long as it is exercising sound busi-
ness judgment.  As a result of the procedural hurdles that
shareholders face, “[d]erivative suits in fact are relatively rare,” and
even when they commence, they usually settle prior to trial.109  Thus,
derivative litigation as a source of shareholder governance is thought
103 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 754 (2002); Bertrand & Mul-
lainathan, supra note 19, at 930; Richard M. Cyert et al., Corporate Governance, Take-
overs, and Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence, 48 MGMT. SCI. 453, 456
(2002).
104 See Perfect Payday: Options Scorecard, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, http://online.wsj.com/
public/resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html (last visited Sept. 22,
2011).
105 See infra notes 108–15 and accompanying text.
106 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 46–47 (2004)
(outlining procedural obstacles faced by shareholders in connection with derivative
suits).
107 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
108 Allison v. Gen. Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1117 n.17 (D. Del. 1985).
109 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 385 (2002).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-1\NDL107.txt unknown Seq: 20  9-JAN-12 9:50
370 notre dame law review [vol. 87:1
to be an ineffective tool for corporate governance as the law fre-
quently defers to postures favorable to corporations.110
Federal securities litigation offers no easier path for shareholders
as Congress and courts have in recent history taken positions that
favor corporate management over plaintiff-shareholders.  For
instance, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, which made it procedurally more difficult for plaintiff-share-
holders as it relates to, inter alia, pleadings and discovery.111  Courts,
including the U.S. Supreme Court, have similarly made it procedur-
ally more difficult for plaintiff-shareholders by, among other matters,
redefining standards for liable parties and proof of loss causation.112
The collective result, as Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted, is that:
“To be successful, a securities class-action plaintiff must thread the eye
of a needle made smaller and smaller over the years by judicial decree
and congressional action.”113
Substantively, the law has also shown great deference to corpo-
rate executives under the common law doctrine known as the business
judgment rule.114  The business judgment rule “establishes a presump-
110 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation without Foundation?, 7
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 84 (1991).
111 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737.
112 See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148
(2008) (limiting liable parties in private securities litigation); Dura Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (redefining standards for loss causation); Oscar
Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 270 (5th Cir.
2007) (refining the requirements for showing loss causation via stock price decline at
the class certification phase of a suit).
113 Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir.
2009).
114 See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Whatever the termi-
nology, the fact is that liability is rarely imposed upon corporate directors or officers
simply for bad judgment and this reluctance to impose liability for unsuccessful busi-
ness decisions has been doctrinally labeled the business judgment rule.”); Shlensky v.
Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (“In a purely business corporation
. . . the authority of the directors in the conduct of the business of the corporation
must be regarded as absolute when they act within the law, and the court is without
authority to substitute its judgment for that of the directors.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 41 F. Supp. 334, 339 (D. Del.
1941))); Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 365 (N.Y. 1888) (“[T]he powers of those
intrusted [sic] with corporate management are largely discretionary.”); Kamin v. Am.
Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810–11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (“The directors’ room
rather than the courtroom is the appropriate forum for thrashing out purely business
questions . . . .”), aff’d, 387 N.Y.S. 993 (N.Y. 1976).
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tion against judicial review” of substantive business decisions.115  As a
result, courts rarely second-guess the decisions of corporate executives
or substitute their judgments for the judgments of corporate execu-
tives,116 regardless of how catastrophic the outcomes may be, or how
horrendous the decision-making process may look in hindsight.117  As
the Delaware Supreme Court famously stated:
[T]he business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental
principle, codified in [Delaware General Corporation Law] 141(a),
that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed
by or under its board of directors. . . . The business judgment rule
exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the mana-
gerial power granted to Delaware directors.118
The underlying assumption is that businessmen, not judges, are
better suited to make business decisions.  While that assumption gen-
erally makes practical sense, this almost carte blanche judicial defer-
ence to executive corporate decisions is exceedingly rare in American
jurisprudence.  Courts generally do not extend such deference when
adjudicating other specialized and complex subjects like medicine or
engineering.119  Coincidentally, the other prominent area where
courts have exhibited such deference is the executive decisions of
presidents, particularly on matters relating to national security.120
115 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 90 (2004); see also Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 778 (“[C]ourts of equity
will not undertake to control the policy or business methods of a corporation,
although it may be seen that a wiser policy might be adopted and the business more
successful if other methods were pursued.”).
116 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“[J]udges
are not business experts.”).
117 The business judgment rule, however, is not without its limits. See Joy, 692 F.2d
at 886 (“[The business judgment rule] does not apply in cases, e.g., in which the
corporate decision lacks a business purpose, is tainted by a conflict of interest, is so
egregious as to amount to a no-win decision, or results from an obvious and pro-
longed failure to exercise oversight or supervision . . . .” (internal citations omitted));
Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 779 (holding that the business judgment rule does not protect
decisions that involve illegality, fraud, or bad faith).
118 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (internal citations
omitted).
119 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 94 (1991) (questioning the rationale that permits generalist jurists to
adjudicate over controversies involving engineering design but not business deci-
sions); Bainbridge, supra note 115, at 120 (“[N]o ‘medical judgment’ or ‘design judg-
ment’ rule precludes judicial review of malpractice or product liability cases.”).
120 This similarity lends additional credence to the comparison of unitary presi-
dents to iconic executives in Part II.B, supra. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,
309–10 (1981) (deferring to the Secretary of State on a national security matter);
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While judicial deference to corporate executives encourages effi-
cient business decisions by diminishing the fear and apprehension of
hindsight judgment,121 such deference can become excessive and
problematic when compounded with the absence of organizational
mechanisms for checks-and-balances, as is the case with many iconic
executives.122  Such excessive deference can lead to perilous outcomes
for a firm, its shareholders, and the greater public.
Because corporations play such a vital role in the life of individu-
als and states, their governance can impact a whole host of prosaic
and profound issues.123  When Enron collapsed in 2001, billions of
dollars in market value evaporated for investors and retirees, and
25,000 people around the world lost their jobs.124  During its heyday,
Enron’s senior executives were viewed by business commentators as
paragons of a new, elite corporate milieu.125  In 2008, the failure of
Lehman Brothers nearly pushed the global financial market to the
brink of systemic failure.126  Millions of jobs were lost in connection
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (permitting the concealment of evi-
dence by the executive branch for national security purpose); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 333 (1936) (submitting to executive judgment on an
economic issue in the national security context); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246
U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (“The conduct of the foreign relations of our government is
committed by the Constitution to the executive . . . . [It] is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision.”); In re Terrorist Attack on Sept. 11, 2001, No. 03 MDL 1570, 03
Civ. 6978(RCC), 2004 WL 1348996, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004) (“This Court defers
to the judgment of the executive branch with respect to issues of national security
. . . .”).
121 Some studies strongly suggest that additional legal protections for investors
may actually lead to enhanced returns as opposed to stifle economic growth. See, e.g.,
Rui Castro et al., Investor Protection, Optimal Incentives, and Economic Growth, 119 Q.J.
ECON. 1131, 1131–35, 1166–67 (2004) (finding a “positive association between inves-
tor protection and profit growth”); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corpo-
rate Valuation, 57 J. FINANCE 1147, 1148–51 (2002) (suggesting that strong protections
for investors of financial products can lead to higher rates of return).
122 See, e.g., Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
95, 114 (2004) (discussing how state corporate law’s deference to management con-
tributed to significant increases in executive compensation).
123 See Ramirez, supra note 78, at 354 (“Corporations are the pivotal store of risk
capital in the United States, and the key holder of society’s wealth.  The manner in
which corporations are governed will affect a wide range of national issues—from
economic inequality to globalization.”).
124 See A. C. FERNANDO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 296–300 (2009).
125 See, e.g., MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 74, at 329 (discussing the business
press’s admiration of Enron’s leadership at the time of its peak).
126 See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, Too Big to Fail, Too Blind to See, 80 MISS. L.J. 355, 355–67
(2010) (reviewing ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL (2009) and summarizing
key episodes of the recent financial crisis). See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N,
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with the financial crisis.127  Iconic executives led both firms.  Jeffrey
Skilling, Ken Lay, and Andy Fastow ruled Enron like an imperial tri-
umvirate during its spectacular ascent and equally spectacular
crash.128  Dick Fuld was the longtime powerful CEO of Lehman Broth-
ers, one of Wall Street’s largest investment banks, at the time of its
collapse.129  In both instances, these executives were afforded exces-
sive deference over extended periods of time, which ultimately played
a critical role in the demise of their respective firms and the disastrous
consequences that followed their downfalls.
B. Overconfidence
Numerous studies have shown that individuals often have an
abundance of confidence in their skills, intellect, and predictive pow-
ers.130  A majority of Americans believe that their marriages will last
until death does them part, even though fifty percent of all marriages
end in divorce or separation.131  Lottery players believe that they have
a reasonable chance of winning the jackpot in the face of astronomi-
cal odds to the contrary.132  Individuals who ascend to the executive
suites of the corporate hierarchy generally do not suffer from a deficit
of confidence.133  Individuals revered as iconic executives usually have
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xv–24 (2011) (studying the origins and
causes of the financial crisis).
127 See, e.g., David Leonhardt, In Wreckage of Lost Jobs, Lost Power, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
20, 2011 at B1 (reporting on the jobs lost in the United States following the financial
crisis).
128 See MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 74, at 405–11 (discussing Enron’s executives
and the board’s deference to them).
129 See Lin, supra note 126, at 359–60 (summarizing key episodes involving Dick
Fuld in the waning hours of Lehman Brothers).
130 See David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of
Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES 334, 334 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds.,
2002) (“One of the most robust findings in the psychology of prediction is that peo-
ple’s predictions tend to be optimistically biased.”); Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo,
Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17,
27 (1993).
131 See ROSE M. KREIDER & JASON M. FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NUMBER, TIMING,
AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES: 1996, at 17–18 (2002) (indicating the
large number of marriages that end in divorce or separation).
132 See generally Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries and Why it Matters,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 71, 121–22 (analyzing why individuals play the lottery despite the
strong odds against winning).
133 See Antonio E. Bernardo & Ivo Welch, On the Evolution of Overconfidence and
Entrepreneurs, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 301, 301–04 (2001); Troy A. Paredes, Too
Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Govern-
ance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 675 (2005) (suggesting that “business executives,
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-1\NDL107.txt unknown Seq: 24  9-JAN-12 9:50
374 notre dame law review [vol. 87:1
a surplus of confidence.134  A healthy dose of confidence is a neces-
sary ingredient for successful leadership;135 however, excessive confi-
dence can lead to disastrous and dangerous tendencies.
Iconic executives who operate with scarce dissent and bountiful
deference are especially susceptible to the perils of overconfidence.136
The scarcity of dissent combined with the abundance of deference
can lead iconic executives to engage in excessively risky actions or
investments.  Overconfidence in one’s investment and business strate-
gies can lead one to invest in volatile and risky positions without prop-
erly considering the downside,137 and once invested, become
reluctant to withdraw from such bad investments.138  Studies have sug-
gested that executive overconfidence can lead to the overpayment of
acquisitions or the adoption of unreasonably harmful defensive tactics
to avoid a takeover.139
particularly CEOs, suffer from overconfidence—often referred to more pejoratively as
executive ‘ego,’ ‘hubris,’ or ‘arrogance’”).
134 See  Dan Lovallo & Daniel Kahneman, Delusions of Success: How Optimism Under-
mines Executives’ Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV., July 2003, at 56, 57–59; Richard Roll, The
Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUSINESS 197, 197–200 (1986) (discussing
the hubris of executives in the context of corporate takeovers).
135 See ADAM BRYANT, THE CORNER OFFICE 24–40 (2011) (chronicling the impor-
tance of “battled-hardened confidence” for corporate executives). See generally
ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, Confidence (2006) (examining the role of confidence in
the success or failure of an enterprise).
136 See KANTER, supra note 135, at 63–84.
137 See David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV.
537, 555 (2006) (“[M]ost investors mistakenly believe they can beat the market.”);
Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral
Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 627, 663–65
(1996) (explaining that investors overvalue previous successes based on a perceived
level of masterful skill); Susanna Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Precautions:
Conveying Cautionary Warnings in Corporate Forward-Looking Statements, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 929, 961 (2005) (“The illusion of control causes investors to believe that positive
investment outcomes are due to investors’ own skills and superior strategy, rather
than good luck.”).
138 See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 13 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 101, 167 (1997) (classifying this consequence of overconfidence as the “opti-
mism-commitment whipsaw”).
139 See J.B. Heaton, Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33,
42–43 (2002) (studying the dangers of managerial overconfidence in defending
against a takeover); Roll, supra note 134, at 197–200 (discussing the hubris of execu-
tives in the context of corporate takeovers); Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Win-
ner’s Curse, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1998, at 191 (explaining how winners of auctions
tend to overpay for their winning bid).
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Overconfidence in their own abilities also can lead iconic execu-
tives to disengage from active management of critical issues or to fail
to acknowledge personal shortcomings.140  For example, Warren Buf-
fett, believing in the superiority of a laissez-faire management style,
does not actively manage Berkshire Hathaway’s numerous businesses
and its hundreds of thousands of employees.141  Berkshire Hathaway
consists of more than seventy-five operating companies with over
250,000 employees142 that generate over $136 billion annually in reve-
nue.143  These companies operate in diverse industries such as insur-
ance, confectioneries, railroad systems, power generation, and
furniture leasing.144  Mr. Buffett manages these businesses with only
twenty-one people at his headquarters.145  Berkshire Hathaway’s Vice
Chairman, Charlie Munger, once described the firm’s management
style as, “delegation just short of abdication.”146  Mr. Buffett’s manage-
ment record generally has been lauded as exemplar, and he fre-
quently has acknowledged his own limitations.147  However, would the
market tolerate such a hands-off approach from another CEO?148
And more importantly, is such an approach really in the best interest
of investors and public welfare for such a large and important
corporation?
Overconfidence of iconic executives poses a real corporate gov-
ernance threat, given the excessive deference granted to them by
140 See Stephen E. Clapham & Charles R. Schwenk, Self-Serving Attributions, Manage-
rial Cognition, and Company Performance, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 219, 227–28 (1991);
Hayward et al., supra note 14, at 645–47 (2004) (discussing how executive overconfi-
dence can lead to strategic inertia); Edward J. Zajac & Max H. Bazerman, Blind Spots
in Industry and Competitor Analysis: Implications of Interfirm (Mis)Perceptions for Strategic
Decisions, 16 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 37, 37–41 (1991) (theorizing on the causes of “blind
spots” in the context of corporate actions).
141 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Delegator in Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2011, at WK4.
142 See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 106 (2011).
143 See Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., The Party’s Over for Buffett, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2011, at
A21.
144 See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., supra note 142, at Inside Cover.
145 See Sorkin, supra note 141, at WK4.
146 David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Berkshire Hathaway: The Role of Trust in Govern-
ance, STAN. GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS., CORP. GOVERNANCE RES. PROGRAM, 2 (May 28,
2010), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/cgrp/documents/CGRP02-BerkshireHathaway.
pdf.
147 See ROBERT P. MILES, THE WARREN BUFFETT CEO 3–7 (2003).
148 In the Spring of 2011, Mr. Buffett received significant criticism for his hands-
off corporate governance style following questionable securities transactions by one of
his key lieutenants and senior executives, David Sokol. See Paul M. Barrett, Sokol’s
Choice, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 2–May 8, 2011, at 50–55; Nocera, supra note
143, at A21.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-1\NDL107.txt unknown Seq: 26  9-JAN-12 9:50
376 notre dame law review [vol. 87:1
their organization and by the law.  The presence of excessive defer-
ence, coupled with the absence of adequate checks, can create a feed-
back loop that breeds more hubris at the senior executive levels and
below, which ultimately can lead corporations down perilous paths.149
“Confidence is not just the emotional state of an individual. It is a view
of other people’s confidence, and of other people’s perceptions of
other people’s confidence. . . . Just as diseases spread through conta-
gion, so does confidence[.]”150  The corporate scandals of Enron,
WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia that caused billions in market capital-
ization to vanish, tens of thousands of people to lose their livelihoods,
and countless others to lose their savings, can all be partially attrib-
uted to the overconfidence of, and excessive deference to, iconic
executives.151  Overconfidence may also have played a significant role
in the financial crisis of 2008 that cost millions of jobs and billions of
dollars in bailouts.152  Many senior investment banking executives
(and average homeowners) all operated under the Panglossian belief
that housing prices could only rise; and, thus, they were not properly
prepared when the housing bubble popped.153
C. Licentiousness
The vices of excessive deference and overconfidence can lead to
the vice of licentiousness among iconic executives when checks-and-
balances are unduly sacrificed for efficiency and decisiveness.154
Licentiousness can cloud executive judgment and lead to catastrophic
consequences.  History is rife with tragic tales of political leaders who
embarked on paths of promise but ultimately journeyed to paths of
peril because of overconfidence and excessive deference.  In a pecu-
liar way, the reigns of despots, dictators, and strongmen serve as pow-
erful corporate governance parables for iconic executives.  As such,
the stories of men like Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Iraq’s Saddam Hus-
sein, Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi, and Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe
149 See Paredes, supra note 133, at 702–22 (hypothesizing that executive confi-
dence is a byproduct of corporate governance practices and corporate culture).
150 GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS 55–56 (2009).
151 See Paredes, supra note 133, at 679.
152 See Lin, supra note 126, at 371–73 (discussing the role of overconfidence in the
financial crisis).
153 See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 88–90 (2010) (noting the prevalent view on
Wall Street of an ever-rising housing market).
154 See Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV.
129, 130–35 (2009) (noting that the virtues of efficiency promoted by centralized
management must be balanced with institutional oversight and checks).
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offer instructive narratives for thinking about iconic executives, unbri-
dled power, and licentiousness in corporate governance.
First, like their infamous political analogues, licentious iconic
executives, with good or ill intentions, can successfully engage in
legally compliant, but objectively conflicted dealings and dangerous
practices, given the lack of meaningful restraints on their power.155
Dictates and mandates replace discussions and deliberations. Warren
Buffett, for example, generally conducts little to no due diligence
prior to major acquisitions, which can reach billions of dollars.156  For-
mer longtime Disney CEO and Chairman, Michael Eisner, in the last
few years of his long tenure, allegedly as one court described,
“enthroned himself as the omnipotent and infallible monarch of his
personal Magical Kingdom” to install his then good friend Michael
Ovitz as President of Disney.157  Mr. Eisner would later fire Ovitz and
grant him a severance package in excess of $100 million for about a
year’s worth of work after several clashes.158  Although Disney’s direc-
tors would ultimately be exonerated for the severance package
because they did not act with gross negligence and bad faith,159 Mr.
Eisner’s cavalier hiring and firing of Michael Ovitz as President of Dis-
ney led one Delaware court to declare that Disney’s directors “failed
to exercise any business judgment and failed to make any good faith
attempt to fulfill their fiduciary duties to Disney and its stockholders”
because of their almost wholesale deference to Mr. Eisner.160
Second, like their infamous political counterparts, absent mean-
ingful constraints on their power, licentious iconic executives can per-
petuate their own reigns and enrich themselves to the detriment of
their shareholders.161  Whereas despots can orchestrate sham elec-
155 See MACEY, supra note 12, at 98 (“To the extent that boards of directors moni-
tor management, it is indeed perverse to have the monitors led by the leader of the
executive groups they ostensibly are monitoring.”); Paredes, supra note 133, at 727
(discussing conflicts of interests in corporate governance involving CEOs); WILLIAMS
C. POWERS, JR., ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COM-
MITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 18–20, 2002 WL 198018 (discuss-
ing various conflicted dealings that played a key role in Enron’s demise).
156 See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., supra note 142, at 3.
157 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693, 763 (Del. Ch. 2005).
158 See id. at 733–40.
159 See id. at 760.
160 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d 275. 278 (Del. Ch. 2003).
161 See Walt Disney, 907 A.2d at 741 n.373 (“[O]rnamental, passive directors con-
tribute to sycophantic tendencies among directors and how imperial CEOs can
exploit this condition for their own benefit, especially in the executive compensation
and severance areas.”).
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tions162 and build monuments and mansions for themselves,163 iconic
executives can engage in pro forma self-serving policies,164 accounting
gimmickry, earnings manipulation, or outright fraud to generate
wealth, produce glowing (but misleading) results, and keep them-
selves in power.165  “In the 2001–2002 crisis that led up to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, managers at literally hundreds of companies
inflated earnings, typically by prematurely recognizing income, which
behavior resulted in the number of annual financial statement restate-
ments growing hyperbolically over the period from 1996 to 2002.”166
Iconic executives can become susceptible to subscribing to that Nix-
onian adage of, “Well, when the president does it, that means that it is
not illegal.”167  Dennis Kozlowski, the former CEO and chairman of
Tyco, used corporate funds to throw a $2,000,000 birthday party for
his wife in Sardinia with vodka-trickling ice sculptures, and to lavishly
furnish a New York City apartment, which included a $6,000 shower
curtain.168  These actions were minor relative to $150 million that Mr.
Kozlowski allegedly stole from Tyco shareholders.169  Less nefarious
and perhaps more common, in 2011, Wal-Mart changed its executive
compensation metrics to allow its powerful CEO, Mike Duke, to hit
certain bonus targets, which he would have otherwise missed under
the old metrics.170
As previously noted, the oversight powers of directors and share-
holders are limited.171  The monitoring powers of directors are con-
strained, given the iconic executive’s influence over them and the
executive’s ability to control the agenda of board meetings, which can
162 See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Iraqis Go to Polls; Guess Who Will Win, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 1995, at 10 (reporting on the sham election of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein,
where he garnered over 99% of the votes).
163 See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar, Mubarak May Be Gone, But Many Egyptians Say They
See Too Much of Him, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at A7 (discussing the various monu-
ments built by Egyptian strongman, Hosni Mubarak, during his thirty year reign).
164 See Clapham & Schwenk, supra note 140, at 227–28.
165 See Paredes, supra note 133, at 689.
166 John C. Coffee, Jr, What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of the 2008
Financial Crisis, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 1, 2 (2009).
167 DAVID FROST, FROST/NIXON 89 (2007).
168 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Chief and Aide Guilty of Looting Millions at Tyco, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 2005, at A1.
169 See id.
170 See Gretchen Morgenson, Moving the Goal Posts On Pay, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2011,
at BU1.
171 See supra Part III.A.1.
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lead to perfunctory processes without meaningful oversight.172  As cor-
porate law scholar Jonathan Macey noted:
The concern is that board meetings, where corporate governance is
actually done, have turned into festivals of process that are little
more than kabuki-like rituals at which lawyers and investment bank-
ers choreograph ersatz discussions designed to protect foregone
conclusions from being attacked by judges as being the result of a
defective process.173
Similarly, shareholders have very little recourse to combat such
executive aggrandizement and licentiousness.  Much like citizens of
states led by dictators that generally have little say in the governance
of their states, shareholders of corporations led by iconic executives
generally have little say in the governance of their corporations, other
than selling their shares.174
Third, the reigns of licentious iconic executives like the reigns of
despots and dictators, can reach chaotic ends when they are forced
out of power in the wake of scandal or revolt.175  Such disruptive oust-
ers often leave firms in shambles and shareholders in an abyss because
firms did not have meaningful succession plans, which are critical to a
172 See Robert F. Felton, What Directors and Investors Want from Governance Reform,
MCKINSEY Q., May 2004, No. 2, at 32–33.
173 MACEY, supra note 12, at 31 (noting the limited powers of shareholders in cor-
porate governance).
174 See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 573 (“Shareholders exercise virtually no con-
trol over either day-to-day operations or long-term policy.”); William W. Bratton &
Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653,
662 (2010) (“Even though the shareholders elect the board, they have no right to tell
it what to do.”). While this is generally true of many corporations given the inherent
separation of ownership and management in the corporate form, this is particularly
true for firms led by iconic executives because of the size of their corporations, their
large number of disparate shareholders, and their wealth of institutional resources to
combat shareholder activism.  Large, prominent corporations led by iconic executives
are usually better positioned to defend against well-coordinated shareholder attacks
relative to smaller corporations led by anonymous executives. See, e.g., Stefano Gatti
& Chiara Battistini, Hedge Fun Activism, in PRIVATE EQUITY, 167–77 (Douglas Cumming
ed., 2010) (reviewing the high-profile proxy fight between Carl Icahn and Time
Warner, Inc. in 2006).
175 See Roderick M. Kramer, The Harder They Fall, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct. 2003, at 58
(discussing how excessive deference and hubris can lead to an executive’s spectacular
demise).  While executive transitions may frequently be disruptive, and reflect the
capitalistic process of creative destruction, those transitions need not be so disruptive
as to be materially destructive to the firm. See JOSEPH ALOIS SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM,
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81–87 (Routledge 2006) (1942) (outlining the process of
creative destruction in capitalism).
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firm’s long-term stability and success.176  Contrast this with the peace-
ful and thoughtful succession plan for U.S. presidents as dictated by
the Presidential Succession Act of 1947.177  Despite the importance of
CEO succession, “two-thirds of all corporate directors admit that they
don’t give succession planning sufficient energy and time.”178  Succes-
sion planning for iconic executives may be especially complicated
because of their unique attributes.  For instance, boards dominated by
an iconic executive may find it difficult to plan for his seemingly irre-
placeable absence; and strong internal candidates may decamp for
more exciting opportunities rather than wait for a long-standing
iconic executive to depart before they can lead.  Because of such spe-
cial considerations, succession plans are particularly important for
complex organizations that have been led and dominated by one per-
son for an extended period of time.  In such circumstances, absent a
thoughtful succession plan, the sudden departure of an iconic execu-
tive can lead to chaos and morass.  In 2011, when longtime Egyptian
President and strongman, Hosni Mubarak, was ousted by a people’s
revolution after a thirty year reign where he ruled “as Egypt’s modern-
day pharaoh,”179 the country was at a loss for a successor and in disar-
ray after his fall.180  Similarly, when Hank Greenberg, the CEO and
chairman of AIG, was ousted in 2005 after a thirty-seven year reign
amid allegations of financial misconduct, the insurance giant strug-
gled to find its bearings.181  A few years later, AIG would be at the
center of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, a pre-
dicament attributed by some commentators to the leadership void left
by Mr. Greenberg at the senior executive level.182  Contrast this with
Apple; when Steve Jobs resigned in August 2011, Tim Cook, its then
chief operating officer, was able to step in immediately and seamlessly
176 See WILLIAM J. ROTHWELL, EFFECTIVE SUCCESSION PLANNING 31–41, 131–36 (4th
ed. 2010) (explicating on the importance of meaningful corporate succession
planning).
177 Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006)).
178 A.G. Lafley, The Art and Science of Finding the Right CEO, HARV. BUS. REV., Oct.
2011, at 74.
179 Michael Slackman, A Brittle Leader, Appearing Strong, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011,
at A1.
180 See Kareem Fahim, Military Offers Assurances to Egypt and Neighbors: Protests Reach
Yemen and Algeria, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2011, at A1.
181 See Jonathan D. Glater, A.I.G.’s Sunny Side: An Insurer has a Wide Array of Profita-
ble Units to Sell to Bolster Finances, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at C1.
182 See, e.g., Michael Lewis, The Man Who Crashed the World, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 2009,
at 137–39 (suggesting that a leadership vacuum at AIG post-Greenberg made it possi-
ble for AIG’s London affiliate, AIG Financial Products, to take on excessively risky
positions that crippled the firm).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\87-1\NDL107.txt unknown Seq: 31  9-JAN-12 9:50
2011] the  corporate  governance  of  iconic  executives 381
as chief executive officer because the board had conducted meaning-
ful succession planning.183
Ultimately, because of the licentious, dictatorial actions of some
iconic executives, as one prominent corporate governance commenta-
tor lamented, “the core of the problem faced by investors today, as
revealed by corporate scandals, is that investors must be better pro-
tected from CEOs.”184
CONCLUSION
Iconic executives are both a blessing and a curse.  Society is both
fortunate and unfortunate to have so few iconic executives.  Despite
all their flaws, the corporate governance model of iconic corporate
leaders, like Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie, Vanderbilt, Buffett, Jobs,
and Gates, helped fuel a nation’s unparalleled economic progress and
expansion.185  Yet at the same time, the imperial, unitary model of
corporate governance that this elite caste practices presents serious
challenges and perils for investors and society at large.  While the
accomplishments of iconic executives should be celebrated and
rewarded, such accomplishments should not give them a license to
govern freely nor should it encourage corporate stakeholders to turn
a blind eye to their actions and give in to easy instincts of compla-
cency.186  While good iconic executives can fulfill the promises of
their imperial, unitary governance and sidestep most perils,187 bad
183 See Verne G. Kopytoff & David Streitfeld, Big Shoes at Apple, but Maybe Not Unfil-
lable, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2011, at B1.  While the verdict on Tim Cook’s reign as CEO
remains to be written and judged by history at the time of this writing in the Fall of
2011, the first draft of history strongly suggests that Steve Jobs’s reign as CEO of Apple
ended in an orderly fashion.
184 D. QUINN MILLS, WHEEL, DEAL, AND STEAL 183 (2003).
185 See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance:
What’s Right and What’s Wrong?, 15.3 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 8–11 (2003) (“Despite the
alleged flaws in its governance system, the U.S. economy has performed very well,
both on an absolute basis and particularly relative to other countries.  U.S. productiv-
ity gains in the past decade have been exceptional, and the U.S. stock market has
consistently outperformed other world indices over the last two decades . . . .”).
186 See Andrew W. Lo, Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of
2007–2008, Written Testimony Prepared for the U.S. House of Representatives Com-
mittee on Oversight and Government Reform Hearing on Hedge Funds 12–13 (Nov.
13, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301217
(“In fact, there is mounting evidence from cognitive neuroscientists that financial
gain affects the same ‘pleasure centers’ of the brain that are activated by certain nar-
cotics.  This suggests that prolonged periods of economic growth and prosperity can
induce a collective sense of euphoria and complacency . . . .”).
187 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 20, at 1051 (“[I]t is worth keeping in mind that
for every story about a domineering CEO who should have been replaced long ago,
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iconic executives break those promises and lead directly into perilous
paths.  Because it is often difficult to timely discern a good executive
from a bad one, and because good intentions sometimes can lead to
ill results, corporate stakeholders must carefully examine and scruti-
nize iconic executives.  The role of this cautious examiner can be
played by a cast consisting of boards, independent directors,188 share-
holders,189 gatekeepers,190 journalists, market forces, organizational
personnel,191 industry watchdogs, stock exchanges, state regulators,192
and federal agencies.193  The ultimate identity of the ensemble mat-
ters less than faithful and thoughtful portrayals of their respective
roles.  In the end, because iconic executives govern so freely and so
successfully, they must be governed so cautiously and so closely.
there is an Andrew Grove or a Jack Welch who used the power of the position to make
billions of dollars for their shareholders.”).
188 See id. at 1022–33 (discussing the important role of independent directors in
constraining CEO power).
189 See Bebchuk, supra note 16, at 835–36 (advocating for more shareholder activ-
ism in corporate governance).
190 See Tuch, supra note 72, at 1598–1600 (explaining the important role of multi-
ple corporate gatekeepers).
191 See Paredes, supra note 133, at 742–43 (recommending the appointment of a
corporate devil’s advocate to enhance corporate decision making dominated by
CEOs).
192 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 12–20 (1993)
(stating the important role of state corporate law in corporate governance); Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 251, 276 (1977) (noting that “competition between states for charters” is a key
factor in good corporate governance).
193 See Ramirez, supra note 78, at 317 (proposing “an administrative agency with a
depoliticized structure (akin to the Federal Reserve Board or the “Fed”) with control
over a federal incorporation regime that shareholders may select”).
